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In the repertoire of violence of armed groups, sexual violence ‘occurs in sharply varying proportions to other forms of violence against civilians’ (Wood, 2009). In some cases, sexual violence is conducted in tandem with general violence against civilians, whereas in others it is absent despite the use of general violence. For example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have conducted widespread ethnic cleansing and indiscriminate violence against civilians, yet they have engaged in restraint vis-à-vis sexual violence. Existing literature examining the incidence of sexual violence uses either (a.) leadership and hierarchical explanations that are incomplete in explaining the propensity of groups who already commit general violence to commit sexual violence or (b.) cultural explanations that present unclear causal mechanisms for the propensity of armed groups to commit sexual violence. As sexual violence is an extreme and taboo-breaking form of violence, this proposal posits that a distinct causal mechanism is needed for groups that already commit general violence against civilians also to commit sexual violence. This theory will test whether ideological or normative dehumanisation explains why some armed groups that already commit general violence against civilians also engage in sexual violence. It is hypothesised that norms promoting the animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation of women allow combatants to justify and morally disengage from their immoral actions. This increases the likelihood of sexual violence and explains the variation in armed group use of sexual violence. This paper defines sexual violence as a broad category of violent actions, including rape, coerced undressing, and non-penetrating sexual assault. Although the level of sexual violence perpetrated against men is not insignificant, this paper focuses exclusively on women, as dehumanisation in the context of sexual violence disproportionately targets female victims, who represent the vast majority of cases.

This theory will better predict the propensity of armed groups to commit sexual violence and provide a clear causal mechanism that explains why some armed groups that already commit violence against civilians also engage in sexual violence. The research will enlighten us on the complex psychological and social mechanisms that make such violence possible, tolerated, or systematically reproduced. In doing so, this theory will have useful practical implications: informing policy-making vis-à-vis preventing sexual violence and illuminating the systemic cultural and structural conditions that enable sexual harm.

Literature Review:

Cultural Explanations:

Gerecke, Baldry et al, Cohen, and Scarapati and Pina all argue that the prevalence of gender inequality before the outbreak of a conflict can determine the incidence of sexual violence in said conflict. Gerecke argues that ‘the existence of strict gender norms and inequalities allows for the instrumental use of sexual violence by armed groups’ (Gerecke, 2010). Preexisting misogynistic norms provide a structure in which sexual violence is ‘rational and strategically efficient’ for armed groups to perpetrate. Gerecke exemplifies her theory by discussing the combination of a high incidence of sexual violence during the Bosnia-Herzegovina civil conflict and high levels of propaganda linking gender and ethnicity in confrontational ways directly preceding the conflict. Baldry et al show that there is a consistent and causal relationship between prejudicial normative gender role attitudes and adopting violent behaviours toward women (Baldry, Pacilli, & Pagliaro, 2015). Specifically, the belief that sexual violence victims are less ‘human’ explains a significant part of the variance in individual behaviour towards women. Forms of dehumanisation, such as animalization and objectification, were found to be strongly related to the likelihood of sexual assault. Similarly, Cohen posits that there is a correlation between ‘the relative lack of women’s rights and widespread rape’ and that ‘gender inequality facilitates the acceptance of violence against women’ (Cohen, 2013). Scarapati and Tina build on this work by explaining that individuals perpetrate sexual violence through moral disengagement. Bandura’s social cognitive theory outlines that ‘individuals can disengage from their moral standards and self-sanctions through various psychosocial mechanisms, thus enabling them to engage in harmful and immoral behaviour without incurring self-censure.’ (Scarpati & Pina, 2017). A significant mechanism that allows individuals to disengage from their moral standards is ‘finding justification for their aggressive behaviour in the moral foundations or their culture’ (Scarpati & Pina, 2017). Thus, cultural norms play a significant role in constraining or enabling admissible behaviours for members of that culture. These explanations show that preexisting gender inequality norms can significantly influence individual propensity to commit sexual violence. This literature is a good foundation for assessing the variation of sexual violence in wartime. However, it does not provide a sufficient causal mechanism that explains why gender inequality leads to an increase in sexual violence during wartime. This issue can be observed when assessing armed groups such as the LTTE. The group ‘engaged in very little sexual violence’ (Wood, 2009), despite longstanding gender inequality and patriarchal structures existing in Tamil society.

Leadership, Hierarchical, and Ideological Explanations:

Wood posits that leadership strategies and military hierarchies are key causal explanations for variation in sexual violence. Leadership strategies are the extent to which armed group leaders ‘seek to control type, degree, and targeting of violence’ (Wood, 2006). These strategies are implemented as an effective means towards an armed group's goal. Military leaders may promote the use of sexual violence explicitly or by connivance; ‘using euphemisms understood as signalling to combatants that they will not be punished’ (Wood, 2006). The strength of group military hierarchy determines ‘whether decisions of leadership are effectively enforced down the chain of command’ (Wood, 2006). Particularly with extreme violence such as rape, the extent to which military superiors are seen as legitimate authorities is crucial to obtaining obedience. It is the combination of group leader strategy and the capacity of group hierarchy to enforce endorsed strategies that determines the incidence of sexual violence. For example, sexual violence is a prominent tool to support the ethnic cleansing of a civilian group, as it is a powerful form of terror and punishment. If an armed group views ethnic cleansing as a goal and has a hierarchy strong enough to enforce compliance, they can use sexual violence as a means to achieve this. Wood exemplified her theory by discussing the civil conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which a large degree of sexual violence was systematically perpetrated through a leadership policy to contribute to the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims. These causal explanations are strong vis-à-vis explaining the absence of sexual violence; however, they are not specific to sexual violence and can be seen as explanations for the incidence of general violence against civilians. In particular, Wood’s theory is ineffective in explaining the variation between groups that commit sexual violence and groups that commit general forms of violence but abstain from perpetrating sexual violence.

Sanín and Wood expand on the leadership and hierarchy mechanism by arguing that ideology provides blueprints for strategies and institutions, which therefore determine the incidence of sexual violence. They define ideology as “a systematic set of ideas that identify a constituency, the challenges the group confronts, the objectives to pursue on behalf of that group, and a program of action” (Wood & Sanín, 2014, p.214). This set of ideas includes preferences and beliefs that are adopted either instrumentally or normatively. Institutions and overarching strategies are embedded in ideology, which shape and constrain armed group actions. The effect this mechanism can have on sexual violence was exemplified by Sawari’s work on the impact of ideology on wartime sexual violence. She posited that the perpetration of sexual violence by armed groups is influenced by their ideological principles, proposing a contrast between leftist and religious rebel groups to show this. Armed groups influenced by a leftist ideology are less likely to commit sexual violence as they are ‘guided by values of egalitarianism and gender equality, ’ whereas religious armed groups are ‘influenced by conservative values and gender norms,’ and are therefore more likely to perpetrate such violence (Sarwari, 2021). Viewing armed group strategies as being influenced by ideology allows for a greater understanding of the causal mechanisms behind armed groups that commit both general violence and sexual violence. However, this literature is limited, discussing only leftist and religious armed groups. Furthermore, the specific aspects of ideology that result in the perpetration of sexual violence are not sufficiently explored. The prevalence of conservative norms does not necessarily explain the propensity of armed groups to commit sexual violence. These deficiencies result in a lack of a concrete, externally valid causal mechanism that explains the variation between groups who commit sexual violence and groups who commit general forms of violence but abstain from perpetrating sexual violence.

Research Question and Theory:

This research proposes to assess whether ideological or normative dehumanisation explains why some armed groups that already commit violence against civilians also engage in sexual violence by testing the following hypotheses:

H1: Armed groups influenced by pre-existing cultural norms that promote dehumanisation will perpetrate higher levels of sexual violence against civilians than others.

H2: Armed groups influenced by ideological norms that promote dehumanisation will perpetrate higher levels of sexual violence against civilians than others.

Cultural norms are the ‘norms and rules of behaviour that instruct individuals as to what is and what is not acceptable in a particular culture’ (Scarpati & Pina, 2017). These rules have a powerful influence on in-group members' moral thoughts and behaviours, as culture is the principal way individuals construct their moral self. Cultural norms that promote dehumanisation refer to widespread misogynistic beliefs that view women as lacking in positive human attributes such as morality and competence. This is done by either drawing parallels with animals or by treating women as objects. According to Bandura’s social cognitive theory, these aspects of cultural norms provide ‘the justification individuals need to both engage in immoral behaviour and morally disengage from the consequences of their actions’ (Scarpati & Pina, 2017). Dehumanisation legitimises sexual violence, thus increasing the likelihood of men to sexually aggress.

Ideological norms are the beliefs and preferences of an ideology that are adopted by an armed group. These norms are promoted and enacted by the group through institutions and strategies that are embedded in the ideology of a group. Groups may adopt these ideological norms either ‘instrumentally, as a means to obtain objectives, or normatively, realising an emotional commitment’ (Wood & Sanín, 2014). Such ideologies structure everyday life and influence both ideologically and non-ideologically motivated members. Ideological norms that promote dehumanisation refer to misogynistic beliefs resulting in dehumanisation being embodied at the organisational level of a group, thus increasing the likelihood of members committing sexual violence.

In regards to the first hypothesis, armed groups that consist of combatants from cultures with norms that promote dehumanisation will perpetrate higher levels of sexual violence. Combatants will use their moral framework adopted from cultural norms to justify and morally disengage from the act of sexual violence. Combatants lacking these cultural norms will be constrained by social censure and will thus not be able to justify and morally disengage from sexual violence. In regards to the second hypothesis, armed groups whose organisational ideology incorporates norms that promote dehumanisation will perpetrate higher levels of sexual violence. When dehumanising beliefs are embedded at the ideological level, they shape group institutions and practices in ways that legitimise the use of sexual violence. This creates a framework within the group in which sexual violence becomes morally acceptable and encouraged. Combatants operating in this group will adopt, internalise, or comply with organisational cues, allowing them to justify and morally disengage from the act of sexual violence. Conversely, armed groups whose ideological norms do not promote dehumanisation will lack these organisational mechanisms of justification, reducing the likelihood that combatants will commit sexual violence.

The two hypotheses are distinct but not mutually exclusive. Both forms use Bandura’s social cognitive theory to suggest that dehumanisation can facilitate moral disengagement and encourage sexual violence; however, this effect is operationalised at different levels for each hypothesis. Cultural norms shape combatants' pre-existing moral frameworks, whereas ideological norms are organisationally produced and enforced. These hypotheses are also strongly linked to existing literature regarding wartime sexual violence, particularly Sanín and Wood’s work on ideological explanations and Gerecke’s work on cultural explanations. By examining both hypotheses, this research builds on existing literature and assesses how societal beliefs and group ideologies promoting dehumanisation may differ or overlap vis-à-vis explaining variation in the perpetration of sexual violence by armed groups.

In conclusion, this research proposal identifies a gap in existing literature vis-à-vis explaining why some armed groups that already commit violence against civilians also engage in sexual violence. This proposal posits that dehumanisation is key to explaining individual propensity to commit taboo-breaking and extreme violence, such as dehumanisation, as it allows combatants to justify and morally disengage from their actions. To test this theory, this paper explores two distinct mechanisms that facilitate dehumanisation through the following research question: Does ideological or normative dehumanisation explain why some armed groups that already commit violence against civilians also engage in sexual violence? This research, depending on the result, will better predict the propensity of armed groups to commit sexual violence and inform policy-making in regards to preventing the outbreak of sexual violence.

Bibliography

Baldry, A. C., Pacilli, M. G., & Pagliaro, S. (2015). She’s Not a Person. . . She’s Just a Woman! Infra-Humanization and Intimate Partner Violence. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 1567-1582.

Cohen, D. K. (2013). Explaining Rape During Civil War: Cross National Evidence (1980-2009). American Political Science Review.

Gerecke, M. (2010). Explaining Sexual Violence in Conflict Situations . In L. Sjoberg, & S. Via, Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives (pp. 138-156). California: Praeger.

Sarwari, M. (2021). Impact of Rebel Group Ideology on Wartime Sexual Violence. Journal of Global Security Studies.

Scarpati, A. S., & Pina, A. (2017). Cultural and moral dimensions of sexual aggression: The role of moral disengagement in men's likelihood to sexually aggress. Aggression and violent behavior , 115-121.

Wood, E. J. (2006). Variation in Sexual Violence during War. Politics and Society , 307-342.

Wood, E. J. (2009). Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare? Politics and Society , 131-161.

Wood, E. J., & Sanín, F. G. (2014). Ideology in civil war: Instrumental adoption and beyond. Journal of Peace Research, 213-226.